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The Pa per So lu tion
Jew ish Emi gra tion from Ro ma nia dur ing the Holo caust
MIHAI CHIOVEANU
With June 1941, the Ro ma nian gov ern ment, backed by state in sti tu tions and 
agen cies, turned eth nic clean sing into a top pri or ity pol icy. Dreams of a Jew free 
Ro ma nia (with other eth nic and re li gious mi nori ties tar geted as well) made Ion 
An tonescu and his hench men eas ily ac cept mass kill ing, ghet toi za tion, evacua-
tions, de por ta tions, and re lo ca tions as ef fec tive geno cidal means to achieve en vi-
sioned ul tra-na tion al is tic and re demp tive ends. How ever, with late 1942, and the 
con ti nent wide Holo caust in full swing, Bu cha rest de cided to re ject Ber lin’s In ter na-
tional Fi nal So lu tion. Plans to de port the Ro ma nian Jews to Po land were aban-
doned, and fur ther evacua tions to Trans nis tria halted1. In stead, Ro ma nian de ci sion 
mak ers de cided to re turn to and pro mote emi gra tion, a for mer, long-aban doned 
by that time Nazi strat egy and pol icy, as the only ac cept able so lu tion to the Jew ish 
Ques tion2. By 1943, and only 16 months af ter the ter ri ble geno cidal mas sa cres in 
Bessera bia and Bukovina, Mi hai An tonescu, no less anti-Se mitic when it came to 
Ro ma niani za tion, which he coined as eco nomic re form, yet this time re ject ing “any 
act of bar bar ity”, de ny ing and de flect ing re spon si bil ity for past crimes, took the 
risk to re peat edly in form ex as per ated Ger man dip lo mats, ex perts, and SS ad vis ers 
on Jew ish mat ters that for the Ro ma nian gov ern ment emi gra tion is no longer just 
a faint echo of a pre vi ous, un work able so lu tion, but a vi able, long term goal, and 
al ways fa vored by Ro ma nia pol icy3.
An un ac cept able al ter na tive for the Ger mans, yet a per fect ex cuse for the Ro-
ma ni ans to halt de por ta tions, emi gra tion did not aim for pro tect ing, not to say sav-
ing the Jews. Go ing back to the origi nal plans and prac tices, as they could not cope 
with the hasty dy namic of Nazi pol icy, the Ro ma ni ans made no se cret out of their 
in ten tion to con tinue their eth nic clean sing op era tions by other, more civi lized 
means, and with more prof it able ends: ob tain funds from ran som ing Jews, con tain 
Ger man pro tests, sig nal the al lies that Ro ma nia took a dif fer ent path4. How ever, 
none of the goals were fully achieved by the end. Fac ing crit ics from the West ern al-
lies, pro tests and threats from the de ceived Ger mans, and cor rup tion from his own 
greedy bu reauc racy, Ion An tonescu de cided in late May 1944 to halt emi gra tion ”to 
the mo ment when the state will be able to or gan ize it on se ri ous grounds”5.
1 Mihai CHIOVEANU, ”The Unforeseen Defection. Romania’s Disengagement from the 
Nazi Final Solution”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. VII, no. 4, 2007, 
pp. 879-902.
2 Saul FRIEDLANDER, The Years of Extermination, HarperCollins Publishers, New York, 
2007, pp. 450-451. 
3 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Evreii din România între anii 1940-1944, vol. III, 1940-1942: Perioada 
unei mari restrişti, partea a II-a, Hasefer, Bucureşti, 1997, doc. 556, pp. 273-274.
4 Andreas HILLGRUBER, Hitler, Regele Carol şi Mareşalul Antonescu. Relaţiile germano-române. 
1938-1944, Romanian transl. by S. Neagoe, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1994, pp. 283-284.
5 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Evreii din România între anii 1940-1944, vol. IV, Bilanţul tragediei – renaş-
terea speranţei, Hasefer, Bucureşti, 1998, doc. 357, 358, pp. 395-397. 
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Epi sodi cal and in co her ent, Jew ish emi gra tion from Ro ma nia dur ing the war 
went rather slow as the gov ern ment re fused tak ing ma jor risks and any di rect in-
volve ment in co or di nat ing the op era tions. Con sid er ing the rather small num ber 
of Jews that left Ro ma nia as to reach Pal es tine af ter a long and un safe voy age, one 
can only con clude that emi gra tion did not mat ter much in sav ing the Jews nor 
when it came to eth ni cally cleanse Ro ma nia1. It served rather to de ceive the al lies, 
and as an ex cel lent ex cuse for de part ing the Ger man so lu tion.
Not sur pris ingly, be fore and af ter 1989, Ro ma nian his to ri og ra phy paid at ten-
tion to Jew ish emi gra tion as to bla tantly turn it into an ir refu ta ble ar gu ment for 
the de nial of Holo caust in Ro ma nia. Pre sent ing it as a vig or ous pol icy of An-
tonescu’s re gime, and as part of the ef forts of the Ro ma nian gov ern ment to frus-
trate the Ger man Fi nal So lu tion, some his to ri ans went as far as to trans late 
emi gra tion in terms of pro tect ing and thus, sav ing the Jews2. Con se quently, Ro ma-
nia was pre sented as a gate to safety for not only Ro ma nian, but also Hun gar ian, 
Pol ish, Ger man, and so on, Jews, both le gal and il le gal emi grants. Ana lyzed out-
side the con text, over em pha sized through an abun dance of meta phors, pre sented 
as part of a con tin uum – the fact that from the spring of 1941 to the au tumn of 1942 
the Ro ma nian gov ern ment re jected and pre vented emi gra tion as a so lu tion to the 
Jew ish Ques tion is oblit er ated – , in strik ing op po si tion to the Nazi Fi nal So lu tion, 
and with out men tion ing that the Na zis also fa vored emi gra tion up to 1941, the is-
sue was of ten abused in a des per ate at tempt to di min ish or over look the di men-
sions of ex ter mi na tion and the radi cal na ture of Ro ma nian state anti-Semi tism3. 
Liv ing apart sev eral as pects that were not ad dressed, such as the status of Jews, 
rather refu gees from death than im mi grants, the goals of the Ro ma nian gov ern-
ment and its role in de sign ing and fos ter ing an emi gra tion pol icy, and so on, the 
main prob lem comes with the gen eral view on emi gra tion as a prac tice to be hon-
ored, and not a pol icy to be re con sid ered and criti cally as sessed as it aimed but for 
the de struc tion of the group4.
On their turn, West ern his to ri ans only rarely ad dress emi gra tion, with the 
is sue be ing equally un der-re searched and treated as a ”foot note” to other is-
sues, such as Ro ma niani za tion of prop erty, de por ta tion, and re pa tria tion from Trans-
nis tria5, or the des per ate need for for eign cur rency of a cor rup tion mod er ated 
1 Carol IANCU, Alexandru Şafran, o viată de luptă, o rază de lumină, Romanian transl. by Ticu 
Goldstein, Hasefer, Bucureşti, 2008, p. 176. See also Dinu C. GIURESCU, România în al doilea 
război mondial, Editura ALL, Bucureşti, 1999, p. 160. From March 1941 to August 1944 only 17 
ships with 4 600 Jewish emigrants left Romanian harbors for Palestine. 
2 Bela VAGO, ”The Destruction of Romanian Jewry in Romanian Historiography”, in Yisrael 
GUTMAN, Gideon GREIF (eds.), The Historiography of the Holocaust Period, Yad Vashem, 
Jerusalem, 1988, pp. 405-406, 411, 415. See also Gheorghe ZAHARIA, Nicolae COPOIU, ”The 
Situation of the Jews of Romania, 1938-1944, as Reflected in Romanian Historiography”, in 
Ibidem, p. 427.
3 See Ion CALAFETEANU, Nicolae DINU, Teodor GHEORGHE, Emigrarea populaţiei evre-
ieşti din România în anii 1940-1944, Silex, Bucureşti, 1993; D. ŞANDRU, A. KARETZKI, I. SAIZU, 
”Dificultăţi în ’colaborarea’ româno-germană (1940-1944)”, Anuarul Institutului de istorie şi 
arheologie A. D. Xenopol, XXIII, Iaşi, 1996; Alex Mihai STOENESCU, Istoria loviturilor de stat în 
România. Cele trei dictaturi, RAO, Bucureşti, 2002, pp. 456-457.
4 Dennis DELETANT, Aliatul uitat al lui Hitler. Ion Antonescu şi regimul său, 1940-1944, Roma-
nian transl. by Delia Răzdolescu, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2008, pp. 287-288.
5 Radu IOANID, Evreii sub regimul Antonescu, Editura Hasefer, Bucureşti, 1998, pp. 340-341, 
391.
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anti-Se mitic re gime, abruptly and en thu si as ti cally con verted to emi gra tion1. Scat-
tered through out the saga of the Ro ma nian Holo caust, mak ing a good in tro duc-
tion to the is sue of ran som ing the Ro ma nian Jews in the af ter math of the war, with 
Com mu nists suc ceed ing where fas cists failed2, emi gra tion is ap proached as less 
rele vant in both quan ti ta tive and quali ta tive terms. The ex pla na tion might be that 
from a dis tance, and when com pared with other more im por tant is sues, it looks 
like a de tail, a fig ure on the ma ca bre sta tis tic of the Ro ma nian, not to say Con ti-
nent wide Holo caust3. Much too am bigu ous and am biva lent, the topic of emi gra-
tion might have turned most West ern his to ri ans cau tious, not to say re luc tant to 
re search it in depth.
Is raeli his to ri ans, start ing with Arie Steinberg4, are an ex cep tion in this sense, 
pay ing more, un usual to oth ers, at ten tion to emi gra tion. Da lia Ofer who ex am-
ined ”the roots and evo lu tion of Ro ma nia’s emi gra tion pol icy in the lar ger con text 
of the ide olo gies, poli cies, and pre dica ments of the Holo caust pe riod” pointed out 
that with the late 1930s the Ro ma nian gov ern ment con sid ered emi gra tion as an al-
ter na tive for solv ing the ”Jew ish” prob lem, echo ing in ter na tional plans for the 
mass set tle ment of Jews in ar eas out side of Europe. More over, she stresses the fact 
that al though in the pe riod rang ing from June 1941 to Sep tem ber 1942 Ro ma nia’s 
pol icy to ward Jews set out on more radi cal paths, emi gra tion was never elimi-
nated as an op tion. The case of Struma il lus trates this point and also un der lines 
the Ro ma nian gov ern ment’s re fusal to com ply with Ger man re quests that the 
Jews be de ported to the death camps in Po land. While point ing out that Jew ish 
emi gra tion was a grow ing source of profit for Ro ma nian trans port com pa nies and 
bu reau crats, Da lia Ofer views Ro ma nia’s de lay and sub se quent can cel la tion of de-
por ta tions of Jews to Bel zec as ”a mani fes ta tion of Ro ma nia’s quest for auton omy 
in poli cy mak ing”, and ”a sign of sov er eignty”5.
Re cently, Brit ish his to rian Den nis De le tant made con sid er able room to the is-
sue, pre sent ing it in re la tion to the is sues of the Jew ish de port ees re turn ing from 
Trans nis tria, and Jew ish refu gees fly ing Hun gary in 1944, and con cludes that emi-
gra tion was a so lu tion fos tered by the Ro ma nian gov ern ment, with 1943, on po liti-
cal and less hu mani tar ian grounds, as to pre vent fur ther de por ta tion and kill ings6. 
And so does French his to rian Carol Iancu, pre sent ing the com plex mo ti va tions of 
the Ro ma nian gov ern ment to re turn to emi gra tion, a Nazi pol icy as well up to 
1941, as a so lu tion (achiev ing eth nic pu ri fi ca tion by less risky means, im prov ing 
1 Robert S. WISTRICH, Hitler and the Holocaust, A Modern Library Chronicles Book, New 
York, 2003, p. 157.
2 See Radu IOANID, The Ransom of the Jews: The Story of the Extraordinary Secret Bargain 
Between Romania and Israel, Ivan R. Dee, Chicago, 2005. 
3 Armin HEINEN, Rumänien, der Holocaust und die Logik der Gewalt, Sudosteuropäische 
Arbeiten, 2007, p. 18.
4 Arie STEINBERG, History and Voices of the Tragedy in Romania and Transnistria. The Inter-
national Aspects of Jewish Emigration From and Through Transnistria (1938-1947), a PhD thesis 
submitted at the University of Haifa in 1948, is among the first comprehensive and illustrative 
historical accounts of Jewish emigration from Romania. For a brief presentation of the structure and 
the main conclusions of this work see http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/c/carmelly-felicia/
international-aspects.html (accessed on 9.02.2009).
5 Dalia OFER, ”Emigration and Immigration: The Changing Role of Romanian Jewry”, in 
Randolph L. BRAHAM (ed.), The Destruction of Romanian and Ukrainian Jews During the Antonescu 
Era, Columbia University Press, New York, 1997, pp. 19-20, 36. 
6 Dennis DELETANT, Aliatul uitat...cit., pp. 228 and the following.
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Ro ma nia’s im age in the West, cre ate a new plat form for peace ne go tia tions with 
the Al lies af ter the war), and the dif fi cul ties lay ing be hind (rais ing funds, pro vid-
ing trans por ta tion means, find ing des ti na tions, fac ing Ger man and Brit ish op po si-
tion)1. His con clu sion is ac cu rate and right ful: though it worked against the Fi nal 
So lu tion from 1943, emi gra tion, not an or gan ized pol icy, was the out come of elimi-
na tion ist anti-Semi tism, a prel ude to the De struc tion of the Jew ish ex is tence in Ro-
ma nia, and the epi logue to state or gan ized with 1938 ter ror2.
The aim of the pre sent text is not sim ply to (once again) over come the myth of 
a Sec ond World War Ro ma nia as a ”ha ven for Jews” and a ”gate to safety”. Nor is 
it to down play the ten dency of Ro ma nian his to ri og ra phy to pre sent emi gra tion as 
a key pol icy to solve the Jew ish Ques tion while turn ing other poli cies into mere ac-
ci den tal, as this goal was al ready achieved3. My chief in ter est is with de line at ing 
the rea sons and mo ti va tions be hind the de ci sion of the Ro ma nian gov ern ment to 
em brace, aban don, and fi nally move back to emi gra tion, to un der stand the twisted 
and para doxi cal de ci sion-mak ing proc ess, and the stra te gic logic of the per pe tra-
tors. Aware of the fact that emi gra tion can be (and should be) bet ter ap proached 
from the vic tims’ per spec tive, and in ter preted as a form of re sis tance, and as a goal 
for Zi on ists or gani za tions, I will ex am ine it from the per spec tive of the top per pe-
tra tors and as to un der stand the meta mor pho sis of clean sing na tion sta tism, its 
tap es try and soph is try. Thus, at ten tion is given not only to the Ro ma nian gov ern-
ment, but also to the Nazi per spec tive on emi gra tion, the at ti tude of the Al lies and 
the neu tral coun tries, and the ef forts of the Jew ish lead er ship and in ter na tional or-
gani za tions to res cue the rem nants of the Jew ish com mu nity at large. Ana lyz ing 
the ac tions and at ti tudes of the above-men tioned ac tors in a wider, Euro pean con-
text, might shed some light on the con tro ver sial is sue of Jew ish emi gra tion from 
Ro ma nia dur ing the Holo caust.
Long be fore Bu cha rest, Ber lin de ci sion mak ers con sid ered emi gra tion as a 
mean to achieve a Free of Jews Reich. Tak ing ad van tage from the fact that the 
world at large con sid ered emi gra tion, de por ta tion, and ex change of popu la tions 
as ”time hon ored prac tices”4, the Na zis man aged to force more than half a mil-
lion Jews fly from per se cu tions, seg re ga tion, ter ror, and po groms. All those refu-
gees were not saved. They were but the first vic tims of a brand new type of 
re demp tive anti-Semi tism, with emi gra tion turned gradu ally into state pol icy 
and en vi sioned for a short while as The So lu tion to the Jew ish Ques tion. How ever, 
with the per pe tra tors look ing for ef fi ciency, and over whelmed by their tasks, 
some where be tween July and Oc to ber 1941 they shifted rap idly from emi gra tion 
and ex pul sion to physi cal ex ter mi na tion5.
Emi gra tion, soon to be turned into ”forced emi gra tion”, an euphe misms for 
ex pul sion, rep re sented an op tion only as long as vio lent po liced meth ods not to 
1 Carol IANCU, Alexandru Şafran…cit., pp. 170-178.
2 Ibidem, p. 178.
3 Tuvia FRILING, Radu IOANID, Mihail IONESCU (eds.), Final Report. International Com-
mission on the Holocaust in Romania, Polirom, Iaşi, 2005, p. 384.
4 Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracy. Explaining Ethnic Cleansing, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 67. 
5 Saul FRIELANDER, The Years of Extermination…cit, p. 424. Emigration was forbidden by 
October, on orders issued by Heinrich Müller, the head of Gestapo. The same month, even before, 
the first deportations from Berlin, Vienna, Prague and the overcrowded ghettos of Poland, to the 
extermination camps started.
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say ex ter mi na tion proved to be un popu lar and thus met with re sis tance1. It was a 
kind of Plan A, aim ing to achieve to tal ra cial clean sing by less risky means2, and, 
up to 1938, but among the sev eral, of ten con tra dic tory, anti-Jew ish ”poli cies”, 
none be ing of fi cially co or di nated by state in sti tu tions and agen cies3. With the 
party and the gov ern ment hav ing other pri ori ties, emi gra tion be came with 1934 
one of the ma jor tasks of the SS, bring ing promi nence in Jew ish Af fairs to the 
”black tu nics” and play ing the role of a spring board to Heinrich Himmler, Adolf 
Eichmann, and many oth ers. Not a cen tral aim in the first years, emi gra tion fol-
lowed the sim ple logic of break ing down as simi la tion ism and turn ing Jews to-
ward Zi on ism. Of fer ing and strength en ing in cen tives, a cau tious, prag matic, and 
in stru men tal pol icy, it was first and fore most de signed as not to dam age the econ-
omy and pres tige of Ger many4. Ini tial plans were de vised for 30 years, with the pe-
riod for com ple tion be ing sub se quently re duced to 15-20, 8-10, and so on, as 
emi gra tion was turned into an emer gency and ”con tem plated as an or derly exo-
dus”5. With the SD in charge with or ga niz ing il le gal emi gra tion and de sign ing 
gran di ose plans, such as the ”Milden stein Plan”, look ing for a long term and last-
ing so lu tion, even co op era tion with Zi on ists was ac cepted as nec es sary though un-
sa vory6. Re cruit ing Jews to push for in creased emi gra tion, and work ing with 
Jew ish agen cies to open gates and trans fer funds, was to down play any op po si-
tion com ing from party radi cals, as well as from as simi la tion ists Jews, who pre-
ferred to en dure in des pera tion than leave to un safety7. This way, Pal es tine came 
to be fa vored by the SD sim ply be cause they had Zi on ist sup port, and thus could 
eas ily reach agree ments and make ar range ments to fi nance, or gan ize, ship, and 
smug gle Jews into a land where they were not wel comed8.
How ever, Pal es tine as a des ti na tion was fa vored only for a short pe riod. Sec-
ond thoughts pop up once the ”Peel com mis sion” pro posed a di vi sion of the ter ri-
tory and the crea tion of the state of Is rael. To the ideo logi cal di lemma gen er ated 
by ”pro-Zi on ism”, the Ger man For eign Of fice ex perts on Jew ish af fairs and party 
radi cals added the po ten tial dan gers gen er ated by the crea tion of a Jew ish state, 
and the pros pects to alien ate the Ar abs9. Sev eral re ports com ing from the For eign 
Of fice in di cate that al to gether emi gra tion was con sid ered as a dan ger ous so lu tion, 
with the crea tion of a Jew ish state in Pal es tine as an out come be ing deadly. No mat-
ter the num ber of Jews liv ing there, and the ter ri to rial ex tend of the re spec tive 
state, the new en tity was to of fer the ‘ra cial en emy’ a ba sis for fu ture at tacks on 
1 Eric D. WEITZ, A Century of Genocide. Utopias of Race and Nation, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 2003, p. 109.
2 Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracy…cit., p. 191. 
3 Karl A. SCHLEUNES, ”Retracing the Twisted Road. Nazi Policies Toward German Jews, 
1933-1939”, in François FURET (ed.), Unanswered Questions. Nazi Germany and the Genocide of the 
Jews, Schocken Books, New York, 1989, p. 56. See also Michael BURLEICH, The Third Reich. A 
New History, Pan Books, London, 2001, pp. 281-316.
4 Saul FRIELANDER, The Years of Extermination…cit, pp. 139-141.
5 Ibidem, pp. 128, 168-170.
6 Ibidem, p. 87.
7 Michael BURLEICH, The Third Reich…cit., p. 317. See also Heinz HÖHNE, The Order of the 
Death’s Head. The Story of Hitler’s SS, Penguin Books, London, 2000, pp. 331-332. 
8 Robert S. WISTRICH, Hitler and the Holocaust, cit., p. 51. Also Heinz HÖHNE, The Order of 
the Death’s Head…cit., pp. 346-347.
9 Heinz HÖHNE, The Order of the Death’s Head…cit., pp. 334-335, 347. Michael BURLEICH, 
The Third Reich…cit., p. 317. 
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Ger many, en hance and co or di nate Jew ish World Power1. In other words, a Jew ish 
State would play a role simi lar to that of Vati can for the Catho lic Church, grant ing 
pro tec tion, le giti macy, and in ter na tional rep re sen ta tion to the Jews.
To some, fos ter ing emi gra tion to other lands was an ex cel lent op por tu nity to 
ex port and fos ter anti-Semi tism – the poorer the Jews the bet ter –, and thus ob tain 
sym pa thy and le giti macy for Ger many. As a re sult, at tempts were made to pur-
chase and/or sim ply iden tify other ter ri to ries (des ti na tions) in South Amer ica 
and Cen tral Af rica that could ab sorb the Ger man Jews2. Yet, oth ers, fol low ing Al-
fred Rosenberg vi sion, were soon to en dorse the idea of cre at ing a Jew ish Res er va-
tion, per suad ing the rest on the ne ces sity to find an ”In ter na tional So lu tion to the 
Jew ish Ques tion”3.
Be fore 1938, in the ab sence of a co her ent pol icy, and due to the too many re-
stric tions, the ab sence of funds, des ti na tions, trans por ta tion means, and so on; emi-
gra tion did not worked. Hasty emi gra tion was not fa vored by the Jews, still 
hop ing at a dig ni fied life in Ger many. 37 000 left in 1933, less so in fol low ing years; 
73% of them moved to other Euro pean states, 19% to Pal es tine, and 8% over seas. 
Un able to pre dict the geno cide ly ing ahead, most pre ferred to en dure seg re ga tion, 
hu milia tion, per se cu tion. Emi gra tion, though pos si ble, meant un bear able costs 
and mov ing to un cer tainty4.
Hit ler turned in fa vor of a more vig or ous emi gra tion only with Sep tem ber 
1935, and only with Sep tem ber 1936 the idea of a ‘com plete emi gra tion’, com pul-
sory needed be, be came a fun da men tal aim. Due the eco nomic situa tion, the only 
prob lem for the Na zis was how to do it as not to turn Jew ish emi gra tion into an ex-
tra bur den for Ger many5.
The An schluss was to give emi gra tion a new im pulse. A more radi cal and 
vio lent anti-Semi tism sur faced, soon spark ing into a po grom pre sented by the 
Na zis as an ”ex pres sion of Peo ple an ger”6. Pan icked Jews fled, oth ers were 
dumped over bor ders, and some were ran somed for emi gra tion. 100 Jews were 
killed in the Kristal nacht, with an other 80 0000 be ing forced into mass flight in the 
af ter math7. Eichmann ad vo cated since 1937 that due to mount ing ob sta cles and as 
to speed slug gish emi gra tion, vio lent street at tacks on Jews should be per pe-
trated8. Himmler ad vo cated the same. As emi gra tion proved un work able, with by-
stander ‘greet ing the des per ate with in dif fer ence’, mov ing to os ten si bly forced, 
com pul sory emi gra tion, be came a must, with other coun tries forced to lift re stric-
tion when fac ing street vio lence against Jews9.
More over, con quered Aus tria, due the ab sence of any in sti tu tional ri valry, of-
fered the SS and the party radi cals the pos si bil ity to move to more radi cal ex peri-
ments, turn ing Aus tria into a labo ra tory for ”new meth ods”10. When it comes to 
1 Saul FRIELANDER, The Years of Extermination…cit, pp. 237-238.
2 Karl A. SCHLEUNES, ”Retracing the Twisted Road…cit.”, p. 65.
3 Yitzahak ARAD, Israel GUTMAN, Abraham MARGALIOT (eds.), Documents on the 
Holocaust, University of Nebraska Press, Yad Vashem, Lincoln, Jerusalem, 1999, pp. 126-131.
4 Saul FRIELANDER, The Years of Extermination…cit, pp. 61-62.
5 Ibidem, p. 224.
6 Heinz HÖHNE, The Order of the Death’s Head…cit., pp. 338-345.
7 Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracy…cit., p. 194. See also Michael BURLEICH, The 
Third Reich…cit., p. 323.
8 Ian KERSHAW, Hitler. 1936-1945: Nemesis, vol. 2, Penguin Books, London, 2000, p. 136.
9 Michael BURLEICH, The Third Reich…cit., pp. 336-338.
10 Karl A. SCHLEUNES, ”Retracing the Twisted Road…cit.”, p. 65.
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emi gra tion, the first great suc cess was reg is tered by Eichmann’s Cen tral Of fice for 
Jew ish Emi gra tion opened in Vi enna in Au gust 1938. In less than 6 months 50 000 
Jews were forced into emi gra tion, com pared with 150 000-180 000 in the pe riod 
from 1933 to 19381. Yet, this was of no great sig nifi cance for the Na zis as with Aus-
tria they took un der con trol 183 000 more Jews, more than those who left the 
Reich since 19332.
What Eichmann’s of fice did was to elimi nate bar ri ers and turn emi gra tion 
from prac tice into an ef fi cient pol icy, cen tral ized and su per vised by a state agency. 
Cre at ing op por tu ni ties, get ting funds, work ing with Jew ish or gani za tions, travel 
agen cies and ship ping com pa nies, Eichmann’s of fice proved to be an in dus tri ous 
fa cili ta tor3. His as ton ish ing re sult con vinced his su pe ri ors to open simi lar of fices 
in Ber lin and other Ger man cit ies, than Pra gue, fur ther more, place the en tire op era-
tion un der Heinrich Mul ler’s, than Reinhardt Hey drich’s su per vi sion as to speed 
it up. Es ti mates were made that the Reich will be cleansed of Jews in 8-10 years. 
For the first time it looked like when emi gra tion rep re sented a vi able so lu tion, 
with Rosenberg al lud ing that no less than 15 mil lion will emi grate in the fu ture. 
With more lists, more ex perts, and more of fices, or gan ized, forced emi gra tion, as 
de viced by Eichmann, was turned into a ‘pro to type for SS poli cies be tween Kristal-
nacht and the out break of war’, when op por tu ni ties di min ished, forc ing the Na zis 
to move hast ily to de por ta tion and ex pul sion4.
With July 1939, the Reichs ver e in gung (Reich As so cia tion of the Jews in Ger-
many; the Ro ma nian Cen trala was a car bon copy of it), cen tral iz ing and con trol-
ling the ac tiv ity of all pre vi ous Jew ish or gani za tions, had but one ma jor goal: to 
fos ter and fur ther emi gra tion, of poor Jews first5. With the Ge stapo in charge as the 
de ter min ing agency, and the SD loos ing in de pend ence and ini tia tive, the pol icy 
turned more dog matic and radi cal. Emi gra tion be came an is sue of state se cu rity, 
and co op era tion with Zi on ists was brought to an end6. In stead of Pal es tine, Euro-
pean coun tries, the USA, and Latin Amer ica were pre ferred as des ti na tions, with 
the SS know ing that, in the grip of eco nomic de pres sion, most would re fuse im-
pov er ished and des ti tute Jews. The pol icy was dou ble folded this time: emi gra-
tion was to help cleanse Ger many and make some profit on one hand; to stir up 
hos til ity, spark anti-Se mitic at ti tudes, and turn the im age of Ger many and Na zism 
from bar baric into a cham pion and leader, a ma jor po liti cal force to solve a para-
mount prob lem7. The Evian le Bains Con fer ence from 6-13 July 1938, a to tal fail-
ure, was but to en cour age them in this sense. With one ex cep tion, no coun try, not 
even the or gan iz ers wanted to take more Jews. USA and Pal es tine were kept out of 
the agenda from the start. Jew ish emi gra tion was trans lated in terms of a refu gee 
prob lem, with a long term in ter na tional so lu tion be ing fa vored by the League of 
1 Ibidem, p. 66.
2 Michael BURLEICH, The Third Reich…cit., p. 322.
3 Yitzahak ARAD, Israel GUTMAN, Abraham MARGALIOT (eds.), Documents on the 
Holocaust, cit., p. 99.
4 Cristopher BROWNING, The Origins of the Final Solution. The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, 
September 1939-March 1942, University of Nebraska Press, Yad Vashem, Lincoln, Jerusalem, 
2004, p. 37.
5 Saul FRIELANDER, The Years of Extermination…cit, pp. 59, 318-319.
6 Heinz HÖHNE, The Order of the Death’s Head…cit., p. 349.
7 Robert S. WISTRICH, Hitler and the Holocaust, cit., p. 50. See also Saul FRIELANDER, The 
Years of Extermination…cit, p. 214.
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Na tions, and an In ter gov ern men tal com mis sion to work it out on the ba sis of ex ist-
ing laws and prac tices. Nazi pol icy was not de nounced, not even men tioned, nor 
were Jews men tioned as vic tims of a pol icy of per se cu tion1. Hy poc risy and ra cism 
com ing from by stand ers, com bined with rage, sor row ness, and frus tra tions com-
ing from Zi on ists, fac ing pro pos als of ”breath tak ing cynism”2. For Hit ler, the out-
come rep re sented an op por tu nity to mock hu mani tar ian pre ten tions of west ern 
de moc ra cies, while turn ing a Ger man do mes tic is sue into an In ter na tional prob-
lem3. All in all, UK took some 10 000 chil dren, the fa mous Kin der trans port, the Do-
mini can Re pub lic ac cepted 100 000, and USA 132 000. For the rest, the so lu tion was 
to look for un cer tain refu gee in Shang hai, Cuba, Mex ico and other places, tak ing 
dan ger ous jour neys on rusted ships or by land, ”roam ing the world with no atom 
of hope”4. Some, like the pas sen gers of St’Louis, re turned to Ham burg, found ref-
uge in Hol land and France, as to soon be reached by the ”shadow of swas tika”.
Did the oth ers, USA and UK first, fail to un der stand the cen tral ity of the Jew-
ish Ques tion to the Nazi mind and pol icy? What is for sure is that they could not 
fore see the Fi nal So lu tion, ut terly re fus ing at the time to en cour age and re ward the 
ex ist ing Nazi pol icy. Bu reau cratic in dif fer ence, a tinge of anti-Semi tism, other pri-
ori ties, se crecy, lat ter on a strat egy of global war, and the im pos si bil ity to de vote to 
one is sue, were but to worse things. ”Walls of pa pers” kept the refu gees out, a 
”proof of in hu man ity of a docu ment with a stamp on it”5.
Brit ish op po si tion to Jew ish emi gra tion be came visi ble with 1937 and turned 
mas sive and fierce with 1939, when the White Pa per turned the emi gra tion so lu tion 
in solu ble for Jew ish or gani za tion, add ing to the fact that most op era tions were ill 
pre pared, and to the Nazi pres sure6. Emi gra tion to Pal es tine be came il le gal. Brit-
ish pol icy was that strict when it came to quo tas that not even chil dren were al-
lowed to en ter, and not even news of mass kill ing, reach ing Lon don by 1942, were 
to change much of the at ti tude. Re sis tance based on the ra tion ale of not turn ing Ar-
abs to the Axis and pro tect ing Brit ish in ter ests in the Mid dle East counted more on 
the bal ance sheet than love, or hate, or com pas sion7. By 1940 Pal es tine ”ruled out 
as a des ti na tion” for Jews8. The ”doors to safety were slammed in their faces”9.
Up to 1944, the logic of win ning the war and not sav ing the Jews pre vailed 
among the Al lies, with the situa tion some what chang ing for the bet ter as the In ter-
na tional Red Cross and the War Refu gees Board start put ting pres sure as to fore-
stall ex ter mi na tion, and thus save the rem nants, turn ing emi gra tion into ef fec tive 
res cue10. With 1942 USA paid more at ten tion to the Fi nal So lu tion, launch ing res-
cue ini tia tives and pres sur ing the UK and oth ers with 194311. In late 1943-early 
1 Yitzahak ARAD, Israel GUTMAN, Abraham MARGALIOT (eds.), Documents on the Holo-
caust, cit., pp. 95-97.
2 Michael BURLEICH, The Third Reich…cit., p. 318. 
3 Robert S. WISTRICH, Hitler and the Holocaust, cit., pp. 57-58. 
4 Saul FRIELANDER, The Years of Extermination…cit, p. 87.
5 See Saul FRIELANDER, The Years of Extermination…cit, pp. 84-86, 89-91, 299-305, 314-319.
6 Ibidem, p. 88. See also Martin GILBERT, Holocaust. A History of the Jews of Europe During the 
Second World War, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1985, p. 79. 
7 Yehuda BAUER, Rethinking the Holocaust, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 
2001, pp. 214-216. 
8 Michael BURLEICH, The Third Reich…cit., p. 591.
9 Martin GILBERT, Auschwitz and the Allies, Pimlico, London, 2001, p. 21.
10 Ibidem, pp. 116, 129, 167-168, 172-173, 177.
11 Robert S. WISTRICH, Hitler and the Holocaust, cit., p. 196.
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1944, the Brit ish gov ern ment at tempted to con tact and ne go ti ate with the Ger man 
For eign Of fice the emi gra tion of 5000 Ro ma nian Jew ish chil dren, mainly or phans 
from Trans nis tria. As the Ger mans al ready had other plans in the Mid dle East, the 
Brit ish were asked to ac cept them to Great Brit ain, with the SS to halt the trans port 
and send the chil dren to the death-fac to ries1. A Kin der trans port was no longer 
worka ble and ac cept able, like in 1938.
With Evian, emi gra tion was re duced to lit tle more than a trickle, with the Na-
zis re con sid er ing and lat ter on aban don ing this pol icy2. Ger man and lat ter on 
West Euro pean Jews were kept alive, with emi gra tion as a re serve so lu tion only as 
long as there were hopes to ran som them, or use the hos tages as a bar gain-cheep 
to keep the USA out of war3. When it came to the rest of the Jews, the Na zis were 
soon to find out that the pro test ing de moc ra cies were too weak and/or in dif fer ent 
to harm Ger many. Blam ing oth ers for fail ing emi gra tion they moved rap idly to de-
por ta tion, evacua tion, re set tle ment, as ter ri to rial so lu tions4. How ever, the shift 
was not that sud den and radi cal. By Janu ary 1939 RCOJE was still to fur ther forced 
emi gra tion of Ger man Jews by all means, turn ing it into an in creas ingly bru tal 
evacua tion5. To some au thors, emi gra tion was con sid ered a so lu tion up to Au gust 
1941, when the first re stric tions were im posed, with Gor ing still ad vo cat ing it in 
May 1941, and oth ers mis in ter pret ing his or ders, a mat ter of word ing, con text, 
and Hit ler’s ir ra tional at ti tude that ech oed in Hey drich’s mind6. Ir rele vant, if we 
con sider that emi gra tion was banned with Oc to ber 1941, due to the war con di-
tions, fi nan cial prob lems, lack of trans por ta tion means, ter ri to ries, and vi sas. In ef-
fi cient, not even when vig or ously pur sued, emi gra tion was to be per mit ted from 
that mo ment on ward only in spe cial, in di vid ual cases, if it was in the in ter est of 
the Reich, and with the ap proval of RSHA7. Oth er wise, Jews were to be evacu ated 
to the Nisko area in Po land, or Mada gas car8.
With Po land first, and than the war of an ni hi la tion in USSR, the Na zis were to 
pre vent vic tims from flee ing to safety. Too many and too dan ger ous to be shipped 
away, the refu gees got trapped as the al lies re fused any im mi grant com ing from 
en emy ter ri to ries. Com mu ni ca tions were in ter rupted, Zi on ists moved on the Brit-
ish side, Pal es tine and other ter ri to ries were closed. In stead, la tently geno cidal 
plans and poli cies were brought to the ta ble9. War brought emi gra tion to an end.
Was emi gra tion ever to work, or was it more of a pa per so lu tion, il lus tra tive 
for the soph is try and tap es try of Ger man re demp tive anti-Semi tism? In prac tice, 
1 Andreas HILLGRUBER, Hitler, Regele Carol…cit., p. 284.
2 Ian KERSHAW, Hitler. 1936-1945: Nemesis, cit., p. 145. Benjamin A. VALENTINO, Final 
Solutions. Genocide and Total War in the 20th Century, Westview Press, Oxford, 1995, p. 251.
3 Robert S. WISTRICH, Hitler and the Holocaust, cit., p. 68.
4 Yitzahak ARAD, Israel GUTMAN, Abraham MARGALIOT (eds.), Documents on the 
Holocaust, cit. pp. 118-121.
5 Ibidem, p. 125.
6 Uwe Dietrich ADAM, ”Nazi Actions Concerning the Jews Between the Beginning of 
World War II and the German Attack on the USSR”, in François FURET (ed.), Unanswered 
Questions…cit., p. 95.
7 Yitzahak ARAD, Israel GUTMAN, Abraham MARGALIOT (eds.), Documents on the 
Holocaust, cit., p. 153.
8 Robert S. WISTRICH, Hitler and the Holocaust, cit., pp. 99, 103. Also Michael BURLEICH, 
The Third Reich…cit., pp. 472, 589-593, 597; Cristopher BROWNING, The Origins of the Final 
Solution…cit., pp. 81-82, 87. 
9 Ian KERSHAW, Hitler. 1936-1945: Nemesis, cit., p. 135.
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the Na zis did not do much to fos ter it. There was never enough money, ter ri to ries, 
ships (rather small, car ry ing on av er age 50 pas sen gers, with rare cases of ships tak-
ing 400 or 500 on board). When they did, with 1938, it was al ready in vain, with the 
Brit ish pa trol ling the coasts, sink ing boats or con fis cat ing them, and send ing the 
crew to camps, fi nally put ting dip lo matic pres sure on neu tral gov ern ments to re-
fuse ships to har bors1. As one of Eichmann’s memos from De cem ber 1940 in di cates, 
only 501 711 Jews emi grated from Ger many and Ger man con trolled ter ri to ries, with 
yet 5.8 mil lion to be trans ferred to a non-Ger man, to be de ter mined, space2.
The case of Ro ma nia is, at a first glance, not that dif fer ent from that of Ger-
many. Emi gra tion was pos si ble, ad vo cated by radi cal anti-Sem ites and ul trana-
tion al ists, and en dorsed by the gov ern ment from 1938 to 1941, at least in the ory, 
as one of the so lu tions to the Jew ish Ques tion. Long be fore the Holo caust, both 
A.C. Cuza and the le gion ari por trayed the Jew ish mi nor ity as crimi nal and dan-
ger ous, para sitic and im moral, ex ploit ing the Ro ma nian ”pro le tar ian na tion”, 
dis loyal to the state, there fore an ”en emy popu la tion” that has to be watched, con-
trolled, de prived of civil and po liti cal right and pro pri ety, and when ever pos si ble 
forced into emi gra tion or sim ply thrown out side the bor ders of Ro ma nia. Over-
seas emi gra tion (to Pal es tine), as well as a ter ri to rial so lu tion, the mass re set tle ment 
of Jews in a non Euro pean land (Uganda or Mada gas car), were not new, nor Nazi 
in spired so lu tions to those that gradu ally turned anti-Semi tism into a com po nent 
of the na tion’s mor phol ogy3.
With 1938 Ro ma nia be came a gate for emi gra tion to Pal es tine, un der Brit ish 
man date, for Jews fly ing Aus tria, Hun gary, Ger many, and other coun tries. Ro ma-
nian au thori ties fa vored their tran sit with out get ting in volved. There were no par-
ticu lar re stric tions, ex cept cases di rectly re lated to regu la tion con cern ing the safety 
of ship ping on Da nube and the sea. Tem po rary ref uge to har bors, but not Ro ma-
nian soil, was granted to those al ready on board of boats ready to take them to Pal-
es tine4. In other words, ex tra Jews were not wel comed5. More over, Ro ma nian Jews 
were en cour aged to ‘vol un tar ily emi grate’ by the gov ern ment, with the new 
anti-Se mitic leg is la tion and pol icy, de te rio rat ing life con di tions, to force many se ri-
ously con sider the pos si bil ity to move to Pal es tine and/or more civi lized and safe 
West Euro pean Coun tries6. To the Ro ma nian au thori ties, emi gra tion to Pal es tine 
rep re sented a so lu tion not only to the Jew ish Ques tion in it self. It was also to, at least 
in part, re duce the in creas ing, with 1937, level of popu lar anti-Semi tism7. Even the 
King was to ad vo cate emi gra tion of Jews to Pal es tine as an ideal so lu tion, giv ing 
some sat is fac tion to anti-Sem ites, thus down play ing do mes tic po liti cal ten sions. 
Most Ro ma nian poli ti cians op posed the new anti-Se mitic pol icy and leg is la tion, 
de scrib ing it as a form of mad ness that would only push Ro ma nia to cri sis. Yet, 
their pro tests had no re sult. The new anti-Se mitic Goga-Cuza gov ern ment took 
dis pos ses sion, emi gra tion and even ex pul sion to Pal es tine that se ri ously as to turn 
1 Heinz HÖHNE, The Order of the Death’s Head…cit., p. 348.
2 Saul FRIELANDER, The Years of Extermination…cit, pp. 92-93.
3 Tuvia FRILING, Radu IOANID, Mihail IONESCU (eds.), Final Report…cit., pp. 28, 102.
4 Dinu C. GIURESCU, România în al doilea război mondial, cit., p. 158.
5 Saul FRIELANDER, The Years of Extermination…cit, p. 88.
6 Raul HILBERG, The Destruction of the European Jews, Quandrangle, Chicago, 1961, p. 671. 
Also Tuvia FRILING, Radu IOANID, Mihail IONESCU (eds.), Final Report…cit., p. 52.
7 Bela VAGO, Umbra svasticii. Naşterea fascismului şi antisemitismului în bazinul Dunării 
(1936-1939), Romanian transl. by Corina Tiron, Curtea Veche, Bucureşti, 2003, p. 69.
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the Brit ish dip lo mats in Bu cha rest worry. Rush ing to tem per the new pol icy, and re-
duce the num ber of im mi grants as much as pos si ble, they hoped not to fur ther ”radi-
cal ize” the tense situa tion, and Ar abs dis con tent1. Fur ther more, Brit ish dip lo mats 
made ef forts not only to halt emi gra tion but also per suade the Ro ma ni ans to take 
back the ex pelled Jews re turn ing from Pal es tine2. The Co lo nial Of fice anx iously pro-
tested to the 20 000 Jews, out of which 9 000 il le gal emi grants, reach ing Pal es tine as 
from April to Sep tem ber 1939; from July to Sep tem ber, 6 323 on 8 ships, of which 6 
left from Ro ma nian har bors, ar rived there3. Their ar gu ments were right; emi gra tion 
was to al low Ro ma ni ans (and oth ers) get rid of un de sir ables and also make some 
profit out of it4. Lastly, the Brit ish were not the only to pro test. Up to 1940, Ger man 
of fi cials also pres sured the Ro ma nian gov ern ment, do ing their best to hin der emi-
gra tion of Jews from ter ri to ries other than Ger many, Aus tria, and the Pro tec tor ate of 
Bo he mia. The scope was to ”elimi nate com pe ti tion” as to maxi mize emi gra tion 
from Nazi con trolled ter ri to ries, none the less con trol the op era tion, which to some 
was ”good busi ness”, an as pect as rele vant at the time as clean sing5.
As some docu ments in di cate, the ef forts were not in vain, at least when it 
comes to the Brit ish. With Janu ary 1940, tran sit ing Ro ma nia be came in creas ingly 
dif fi cult due to the Brit ish-Ro ma nian agree ment to pre vent the emi gra tion of Jews 
to Pal es tine. Many of those ar riv ing to Ro ma nia were not al lowed to land, but kept 
on ships in ter ri ble con di tions, wait ing for vi sas and trans fer to big ger ships6. Ro-
ma nian ships were no longer to take part in trans ports or as sist for eign ships car ry-
ing Jew ish emi grants on board7. Turn ing the Jews into ”un wanted refu gees”, not 
help ing them, Ro ma ni ans were now work ing to ward the Co lo nial of fice and 
against the Ger mans. Not fos ter ing emi gra tion, Ro ma nian au thori ties had only 
one con cern, to in spect the ships tech ni cally and see if they could jour ney safely 
on sea, as to pre vent any im pli ca tion of Ro ma nia in po ten tial in ter na tional scan-
dals that might have had oc curred in case of sink age.
When it came to Ro ma nian Jews, the Mi ron Cristea gov ern ment con tin ued to fa-
vor emi gra tion, with des ti na tions to be iden ti fied and ne go ti ated through the 
League of Na tions8. The For eign Af fairs min is try, A. Petrescu Com nen, moved as far 
as to pro pose an in ter na tional ac tion to re lo cate all Jews of Cen tral and East ern 
Europe9, and even dis cuss with the Brit ish and Ameri can Am bas sa dors the is sues of 
an in ter na tional loan of funds, and of a ter ri tory of the Brit ish Em pire were to cre ate 
a na tional home land for them. The Brit ish Am bas sa dor, Reginald Hoare, re al ized 
how tense the situa tion was, and asked Lon don to se ri ously con sider Ro ma nian pro-
pos als10, with the Brit ish gov ern ment not pay ing at ten tion, plac ing Ro ma nian re-
quests on a sec ond plan, as they were busy with Mu nich, also re laxed once they 
be lieved Ro ma nian anti-Semi tism was no longer deadly with Codre anu exe cuted 
and Iron Guard be headed.
1 Ibidem, pp. 72-76.
2 Martin GILBERT, Holocaust…cit., pp. 79-81. 
3 See Dinu C. GIURESCU, România în al doilea război mondial, cit., p. 159.
4 Ibidem, pp. 159-160.
5 Cristopher BROWNING, The Origins of the Final Solution…cit., pp. 195-197.
6 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Perioada unei mari restrişti, partea a II-a, cit., doc. 625, pp. 377-378.
7 Ibidem, doc. 626, p. 379.
8 Bela VAGO, Umbra svasticii…cit., p. 78.
9 Ibidem, pp. 78-79.
10 Ibidem, p. 79.
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Be tween Oc to ber 1938 and De cem ber 1941 some 4346 Jew ish emi grants from 
Cen tral Europe tran sited Ro ma nia on their way to Pal es tine. To say that Carol II 
dic ta tor ship was less anti-Se mitic than the Na zis, mod er ated and in flu enced by 
the con text is point less. What rests is that it paved the way to the Holo caust. This 
”milded” pol icy marked the be gin ning of a proc ess that brought the Ro ma nian 
state, mov ing from emi gra tion to a ter ri to rial so lu tion, Trans nis tria, closer and 
closer to Nazi Ger many1. By late 1941, the Struma case, was in dica tive not only for 
the prob lems gen er ated by emi gra tion, but also for the des per ate and de plor able 
con di tion of the Ro ma nian Jews, liv ing a coun try of po groms, mass kill ings, ghet-
tos, and de por ta tion2.
In the af ter math of the 1940 ter ri to rial rapt, the Ro ma nian gov ern ment came to 
the con clu sion that, one way or an other, the Jew ish Ques tion has to be solved. The 
gov ern ment started work ing on a new, radi cal ver sion of We the Peo ple, tak ing the 
Nazi anti-Se mitic leg is la tion as both a ju ridi cal and po liti cal role model, in a pur suit 
of a not yet tran scen den tal but defi nitely clean sing na tion-sta tism by means of law3. 
The ideal ”Ro ma nia for the Ro ma ni ans” was re it er ated, and so was ”eth nic pu ri fi ca-
tion”, with dep ri va tion of rights, emi gra tion, and bor der ex changes of popu la tion as 
”civi lized means” to achieve it4. With Sep tem ber 6, 1940 the au thori tar ian, quasi-fas-
cist gov ern ment headed by Ion An tonescu, turned the ”lib era tion from the yoke of 
for eign ex ploit ers (i.e. Jews)”, ”vi tal to the Ro ma nian peo ple”, into a goal of the new 
Ro ma nian Or der. Ex clud ing, at least in the ory and dec la ra tions, any vio lent means, 
the clean sing pol icy had to be pro gres sive and me thodi cal as not to jeop ard ize the 
ex ist ing eco nomic or der, and of fend the dig nity and mo ral ity of the Ro ma ni ans5. 
With An tonescu in fa vor of state au thor ity, it was not to ex ceed con fis ca tion of Jew-
ish ru ral pro prie ties, con cen tra tion of Jews in ur ban ar eas, emi gra tion when ever 
pos si ble6. By Oc to ber 1940, with Ion An tonescu in fa vor of emi gra tion, the is sue 
was dis cussed with sev eral promi nent Zi on ist lead ers, such as L. Miz rachi and 
S. Singer7. Joint ef forts by gov ern ment and Zi on ists were to ac cel er ate and ease emi-
gra tion op era tions, also re duce abuses, and risks. For the un pro tected, per se cuted, 
seg re gated, still un de cided Jews, the mes sage was clear: there were no good pros-
pects for them ly ing ahead. They had no fu ture in Ro ma nia, with leg is la tion, dis pos-
ses sion, con fis ca tion, fas cist vio lence and dic ta to rial ter ror to con stantly re mind 
them they were un wanted. As a re sult, more than 2 000 Jews emi grated within the 
first two months of the na tional-le gionar gov ern ance.
A memo ran dum ad vanced by A. Zissu to Ion An tonescu in De cem ber, in tro-
duced the dic ta tor with a six years plan for Jew ish emi gra tion or gan ized by the 
Zi on ists with Jew ish money re sult ing from Ro ma nian ized Jew ish pro prie ties. 
Due the new con text, the elimi nated from the so ci ety, ru ined eco nomi cally, and 
liv ing in de plor able con di tions Jews, would be easy to per suade as to ac cept the 
1 Ibidem, pp. 80-82.
2 Saul FRIELANDER, The Years of Extermination…cit, pp. 329-330. Also Raul HILBERG, The 
Destruction of the European Jews, cit., p. 692; Martin GILBERT, Auschwitz and the Allies, cit., pp. 22-25, 
36-38, 75-80. 
3 Lya BENJAMIN, Legislaţia anti-evreiască, Editura Hasefer, Bucureşti, 1993, doc. 4, pp. 51-54.
4 ANIC, Fond PCM, dosar 327/1940, file 31-32.
5 ANIC, fond PCM, CM, dosar 1770/1940, vol. 2, file 783-784.
6 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Documente. Comisia internaţională pentru studierea Holocaustului în 
România, Polirom, Iaşi, 2005, pp. 111-112.
7 Dinu C. GIURESCU, România în al doilea război mondial, cit., p. 159.
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state su per vised emi gra tion to Pal es tine. More over, as Zissu put it, they would 
leave with the im pres sion of be ing lib er ated, not ex pelled. The prepa ra tions were 
to fall on the re spon si bil ity of a Jew ish or gani za tion work ing un der state au thor ity 
to solve all prob lems of the Jews, mainly of poor Jews, with re gard money, vi sas, 
taxes, sub sis tence for sev eral month and in ser tion in the coun try of des ti na tion1. 
The prob lem was, and Zissu knew it, that Ro ma nian au thori ties wanted Jews 
leave over-night, aban don ing all goods and pos ses sions be hind, with yet the war 
to make the proc ess slow and pain ful.
In re sponse, by late De cem ber, the gov ern ment was to cre ate a spe cial Di rec-
tion for Jew ish Emi gra tion, work ing un der the su per vi sion of the Min is try of In ter-
nal Af fairs. The new agency was to ease and ac cel er ate the pri ori tized proc ess of 
emi gra tion as to eth ni cally cleanse Ro ma nia. Both le gal and il le gal emi gra tion were 
to be fa vored, pass port and vi sas to be is sued, with the Min is try of For eign Af fairs 
to con tact other gov ern ments as to iden tify des ti na tions and en sure pas sage and en-
try vi sas. As Zi on ist or gani za tions lacked funds for emi gra tion re lated taxes (130 
USD per per son), the Min is try of Econ omy was to work the prob lem out2. How-
ever, up to De cem ber 1941 the Di rec tion did noth ing to fos ter emi gra tion.
Ion An tonescu him self was to fa vor emi gra tion, pre sent ing it as a so lu tion to 
the Jew ish Ques tion, and a state pri or ity. Ro ma nian and other Jews were al lowed to 
leave to Pal es tine and USA, via It aly. His only con cern was with re duc ing risks 
and costs to a mini mum3. He sim ply trans lated swift emi gra tion in terms of ”soft” 
dis posal of Jews4. Mov ing hast ily from re luc tance and non-in volve ment to pol icy, 
the much too cau tious and greedy Ro ma nian au thori ties slightly gave emi gra tion 
a chance. With war ex pend ing, and re stric tions and prob lems mount ing, emi gra-
tion turned into a mere pa per so lu tion. As to worse things out, dur ing the Iron 
Guard re bel lion of Janu ary 21-23 1941 most of the Zi on ist lead ers were killed by 
the le gion ari, thus hin der ing plans and prepa ra tions for fur ther op era tions.
On Feb ru ary 19, 1941, Dar rien left Con stantza with 522 on board to Haifa. 
Other small ships car ry ing tens of refu gees left from March to May5. Soon, the 
situa tion changed dra mati cally. With June, up to No vem ber 1941, the Ro ma nian 
gov ern ment aban doned plans of emi gra tion in fa vor of mass kill ings and de por ta-
tions to Trans nis tria6. The is sue was re opened in the af ter math of the Ro ma nian 
”har vest fes ti val”, with the gov ern ment to ac cept the emi gra tion of 30 000 Ro ma-
nian Jews from the Old King dom. How ever, plans of emi gra tion were shortly 
pushed to a new dead lock: should other Jews bene fit from emi gra tion?; how to 
deal with Brit ish op po si tion and US pro tests and in ter ven tions?; who would cover 
the costs and take the risks?; what to do with the closely watch ing Nazi ally, ex-
cept for keep ing a law pro file? Emi gra tion (for Old King dom Jews only, as those 
from Bessera bia and Bukovina were to be all de ported) was do mes ti cally prof it-
able, re duc ing the num ber of un de sir ables and fa cili tat ing the Ro ma niani za tion 
1 ANIC, fond PCM, dosar 267/1941.
2 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Perioada unei mari restrişti, partea a II-a, cit., doc. 629, pp. 381-383. 
3 Ibidem, doc. 630, pp. 383-384.
4 ANIC, fond PCM, dosar 21/1940, file 2-7.
5 Dinu C. GIURESCU, România în al doilea război mondial, cit., p. 159. See also Lya BENJAMIN 
(ed.), Perioada unei mari restrişti, partea a II-a, cit., doc. 647, pp. 377-378.
6 Mihai CHIOVEANU, ”The Harvest of Anger: Politics of Salvation and Ethnic 
Cleansing in 1940s Romania”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. VII, no. 2, 
2007, pp. 294-311.
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proc ess. It was some what in ter na tion ally dan ger ous in terms of propa ganda, and 
in for ma tion de liv ered by the emi grants to the en emy, though the threat was not 
un bear able. The Army and the Min is try of In ter nal Af fairs ex pressed in fa vor of 
emi gra tion, with the For eign Af fairs Min is try to dis cuss the is sue with the Ger-
mans, test the re ac tion, and thus avoid any po ten tial con flicts over vi sions, plans 
and poli cies1. The Ger man re sponse was blunt. With emi gra tion pro hib ited since 
Oc to ber 1941, Gus tav Rich ter pro tested to Ro ma nian pro pos als and pre sent ar gu-
ments against emi gra tion, and the fact that me dia was still ad ver tis ing it in Ro ma-
nia2. Fur ther more, he man aged to make Mi hai An tonescu prom ise that Ro ma nia 
will go in line with Ger many. At the same time, in March 1942, and as to de ceive 
op po nents, Rich ter moved to in form Zi on ist lead ers in Bu cha rest that the Reich 
was not against emi gra tion, with the ex cep tion of Pal es tine, which, ac cord ing to 
the Fuh rer, was an Arab land3.
Mean while, in De cem ber 1941, the Min is try of Fi nances is sued a memo to en-
dorse a state or gan ized pol icy of emi gra tion, up to turn ing it into a state mo nop oly. 
For the ex perts of that min is try the case of Struma, with a pri vate agency mak ing 
150 mil lion profit with mini mum in vest ments, in the ab sence of any in sur ance, tak-
ing mini mal risks while us ing cheap, old, rusty ves sels was il lus tra tive. The Ro ma-
nian state could do the same while us ing big ger, as old, un used and un safe ships, 
such as Alba Iulia, with a ca pac ity of 2000 pas sen gers4. In other words, a trag edy 
was turned into a les son of how to make good money out of peo ple’s de spair. Yet, 
the Navy was of a dif fer ent opin ion. Emi gra tion was to cre ate too many prob lems 
in the con text of war. There fore, it was bet ter to post pone it to the af ter math of the 
con flict, as not to turn it un safe and dan ger ous (treat ing peo ple as mer chan dise, 
break ing in ter na tional leg is la tion con cern ing navi ga tion, and so on), and thus 
dam age Ro ma nia’s im age and pres tige, as the Struma trag edy did5.
Con trary to the new pol icy of the gov ern ment, and the ex ist ing agree ment be-
tween Ro ma nia and Ger many to de port Ro ma nian Jews to Lub lin, and in spite of 
nu mer ous Ger man pro tests, emi gra tion, both le gal and il le gal, con tin ued even af-
ter the Struma epi sode, with bribed au thori ties clos ing an eye, and Jews be ing fer-
ried to Is tan bul on yachts and wood made ves sels. The new busi ness looked too 
prof it able to be aban doned. Even Mi hai An tonescu de cided to con tinue con sider 
emi gra tion as a so lu tion, ask ing in Feb ru ary 1942 the Min is tries of Fi nances, In ter-
nal Af fairs and Jus tice to work to gether as to come out with prac ti cal so lu tions 
against ob sta cles to it6. A de cree law pro ject was ad vanced, though only in June, as 
to regu late Jew ish emi gra tion, and cen tral ize ef forts un der the su per vi sion of one 
agency. The goal was to fa cili tate the emi gra tion of as many as pos si ble Jews with-
out en dan ger ing the econ omy. A taxa tion of 40% of each emi grant as sets was in tro-
duced, and fur ther regu la tion con cern ing the liq ui da tion of Jew ish prop erty as 
well. The Cen trala was put in charge with or ga niz ing trans ports and mak ing lists, 
1 ANIC, fond PCM, dosar 166/1940, fila 45. 
2 Jean ANCEL (ed.), Documents Concerning the Fate of Romanian Jewry during the Holocaust, 
vol III, New York-Jerusalem, 1985-1986, doc. 310, pp. 493-497.
3 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Perioada unei mari restrişti, partea a II-a, cit., doc. 651, p. 410.
4 Ottmar TRAŞCĂ, Dennis DELETANT (eds.), Al III-lea Reich şi Holocaustul din România. 
1940-1944. Documente din arhivele germane, Editura INSHR ”Elie Wiesel”, Bucureşti, 2007, doc. 
189,190, pp. 763, 766-767. 
5 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Perioada unei mari restrişti, partea a II-a, cit., doc. 644, pp. 400-402.
6 Ibidem, doc. 650, p. 408. 
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the Min is try of Fi nances was to col lect the re sult ing funds, and one pri vate so ci-
ety to pro vide trans por ta tion means1. Zi on ist or gani za tions were al lowed to or-
gan ize train ing camps for emi grants, with the pro gram ex pand ing to most cit ies 
in Ro ma nia2. Ships con tin ued to leave, yet the re sults are hardly no tice able. In 
prac tice, emi gra tion was in co her ent, much too cau tious, and domi nated by greed 
and cor rup tion. From the point of view of Ro ma nia’s im age it was good. When it 
came to mak ing profit it was ir rele vant. With re gard clean sing it was too slow. No 
sur prise that by mid 1942 the gov ern ment start re con sid er ing the Ger man of fer to 
de port Ro ma nian Jews to Po land, only to un ex pect edly drop it by the end of the 
same year, re turn ing to and pro pos ing new plans for emi gra tion, that in cluded 
now tens of thou sand of Jews. A less radi cal and le thal so lu tion, emi gra tion was 
to help them cleanse Ro ma nia of non-Bol she vik Jews. It also looked lu cra tive for 
a re gime in des per ate need for funds. More over, soon, not only Ro ma nian but 
also Hun gar ian and Pol ish Jews were al lowed to tran sit Ro ma nia, un der mili tary 
es cort, on their way to Pal es tine3. This time, money counted less, with Ro ma ni ans 
try ing to im press the al lies, mak ing them aware that Ro ma nia, when com pared to 
Hun gary (and as to counter the pre vi ous Hun gar ian anti-Ro ma nian propa ganda), 
took a dif fer ent path.
With 1943 big ger and safer Bul gar ian ships such as Milka and Maritza that 
could ferry up to 300 emi grants went in use, with the trans ports be ing or gan ized 
by the Red Cross, with Jew ish money. Ro ma nian au thori ties were not do ing much. 
They sim ply al lowed the trans ports live. The only ma jor change came with the in-
ten tion to ex pand the plan as to in clude some of the Jews al ready de ported to 
Trans nis tria – be fore late 1942 only the Jews of the Old King dom were al lowed to 
emi grate. With de por ta tion to an over crowded Trans nis tria and the Lub lin area 
halted, the Cen trala be gan pro pos ing plans to re pa tri ate the Trans nis trian Jews to 
Ro ma nia, as to pre pare them for emi gra tion, with the Ro ma nian gov ern ment ini-
tially re ject ing the idea. A mem oir by Nan dor Gin gold, dated 19 No vem ber 1942, 
and a re port by Radu Lecca from 22 No vem ber 1942, in di cate emi gra tion as a pos-
si ble so lu tion to cleanse the ter ri tory, with taxes to be paid by emi grants, rela tives, 
and in ter na tional Jew ish or gani za tions4.
When it came to Trans nis trian Jews the plan pro posed the re pa tria tion and 
then emi gra tion of 5000 ”harm less” chil dren, most of them or phans, wid ows, and 
in va lids5. The plan was to be ne go ti ated with Ger man of fi cials in Bu cha rest, in pri-
vate meet ings, with the Ro ma ni ans to in sist that the ar gu ment be hind emi gra tion 
is not hu mani tari an ism, but con sid er able sums of money to be paid by emi grants, 
funds the Ro ma nian gov ern ment very much needed for the war ef fort and as to 
1 Ibidem, doc. 652, p. 411.
2 Ibidem, doc. 653, pp. 412-413.
3 Ibidem, doc. 656, p. 416.
4 Radu IOANID, Evreii sub regimul Antonescu, cit., p. 340. See also Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Do-
cumente. Comisia internaţională…cit., doc. 221, pp. 467-9. Gingold’s plan, advanced to Antonescu, 
endorse the idea to turn emigration from a private initiative and activity into a state coordinated 
and controled policy, and thus a valuable source of money, estimated at aproximately 3 billion 
lei. Unrealistic, as no destination is mentioned, the plan is illustrative for Gingold’s, now working 
toward the Marshall, wishfull thinking to convince the government that emigration represents 
the solution to the Jewish Question.
5 Initial plans took into consideration the repatriation and emigration of 15 000 to 40 000 
Jews from Transnistria.
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pre serve the well do ing of the Ro ma nian popu la tion1. At the same time, Ro ma-
nian of fi cials were to dis cuss with the Brit ish and the Ameri can gov ern ment, and 
Jew ish or gani za tions in Swit zer land the is sue of fi nanc ing emi gra tion, and with 
other agen cies plans to clear the path for emi gra tion to Pal es tine. Yet, the proc ess 
of tak ing de ci sions went rather slow. By may 1943 the Ro ma ni ans were still ne go-
ti at ing with the Ger mans, who ini tially pro tested openly against emi gra tion 
”given the im pend ing fi nal so lu tion of the Jew ish Ques tion” in Europe, lat ter 
post pon ing, im ped ing, de ceiv ing the Ro ma ni ans, the Red Cross, and the Jew ish 
lead ers in Bu cha rest al to gether2.
With plans of Jew ish emi gra tion in ex change for money never to tally aban-
doned3, the Ro ma ni ans were, af ter Stalin grad, but to openly en dorse and fa vor the 
pol icy, go ing as far as to of fi cially in form both Ber lin and the West ern al lies. By sim-
ply re it er at ing the is sue at a time when the Na zis hoped that noth ing would pro-
voke a World re ac tion, al low ing them to kill swiftly, the Ro ma ni ans were tak ing the 
se cret out4. Hard to con clude that the Ro ma nian ini tia tives with late 1942 to let 
70 000 Jews emi grate would have ever suc ceeded. Nor can one say that the plan 
failed once the Ro ma ni ans went dis ap pointed by the al lies’ ini tial pas siv ity, or when 
mak ing the mis take to in form the Ger mans about their plans5. By De cem ber 1942, 
when Radu Lecca in formed Kill in ger on the pro ject to au thor ize the emi gra tion of 
up to 80 000 Jews to Pal es tine in ex change for 16 bil lion lei (267 mil lion Reich marks), 
the Ber lin For eign Of fice could only op pose and pro test to ward the un re al is tic, and 
in di cat ing the Al lies a crack in the Axis pol icy, plan6. How ever, as Hil berg put it, the 
Na zis were to worry pre ma turely, as there were never enough money, ships, des-
ti na tions, vi sas, as to turn the Ro ma nian ”wish ful think ing” plans op era tional7.
A fur ther, in depth and dis tinct fo cus on Ger man re ports and pro test is to 
in di cate if this was one of the main and real causes for a poor emi gra tion from 
Ro ma nia, as it was some times stated8.
By De cem ber 1942, Kill in ger in formed his su pe ri ors in Ber lin that Ion An-
tonescu asked Radu Lecca to or gan ize the emi gra tion of up to 80 000 non-com mu-
nist Jews to Syria and Pal es tine, with a tax of 200 000 lei to be paid by each emi grant9. 
Im me di ately, Mar tin Lu ther in formed Kill in ger that Ber lin is against10, as emi gra-
tion would sig nal Ro ma nia’s weak ness with out im prov ing Ro ma nia’s im age, and 
in di cate a de fec tion within the al li ance. The Ro ma nian plan was un ac cept able as it 
was against the new Ger man pol icy, and had to be stopped as it was to free 80 000 
ene mies, thus pro vid ing the Brit ish with more troops, and gen er at ing prob lems 
with Ar abs in Mid dle East11. More over, not only the SS and the For eign Of fice got 
wor ried, but also the Wer macht, fear ing that emi gra tion from Ro ma nia might lead 
1 Radu IOANID, Evreii sub regimul Antonescu, cit., p. 341.
2 Ibidem, p. 343. See also Tuvia FRILING, Radu IOANID, Mihail IONESCU (eds.), Final 
Report…cit., p. 67.
3 Tuvia FRILING, Radu IOANID, Mihail IONESCU (eds.), Final Report…cit., pp. 68-69.  
4 Martin GILBERT, Auschwitz and the Allies, cit., p. 27.
5 Saul FRIELANDER, The Years of Extermination…cit, p. 594.
6 Raul HILBERG, The Destruction of the European Jews, cit., p. 696.
7 Ibidem, p. 697.
8 Andreas HILLGRUBER, Hitler, Regele Carol…cit., p. 283 and the following.
9 Ottmar TRAŞCĂ, Dennis DELETANT (eds.), Al III-lea Reich…cit., doc. 120, pp. 568-569.
10 Andreas HILLGRUBER, Hitler, Regele Carol…cit., p. 283. 
11 Ottmar TRAŞCĂ, Dennis DELETANT (eds.), Al III-lea Reich…cit., doc. 121, p. 570.
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to a dras tic drop in ships needed for the war ef fort. The Ger man mili tary even pro-
vided a list of ships that left Ro ma nian har bors, very few, rather small, with tens of 
emi grants, and the dates of de par ture. They also ex plained the pro ce dures. Ships 
were leav ing the har bors, not only Con stantza, for Turk ish har bors, than, un der a 
neu tral flag, to Pal es tine, were most are con fis cated by the Brit ish. Oth ers were 
sunk on pur pose, with in sur ances be ing paid to own ers, and pas sen gers con tinu-
ing their jour ney by land. Ro ma nian au thori ties were greet ing per mis sion, the rest 
be ing done by the travel agency Ro ma nia1. The Wer macht re port was to pro vide 
Lu ther with a new ar gu ment against emi gra tion – loos ing ships in fa vor of the en-
emy2 –, with des per ate Kill in ger ask ing for more in for ma tion (num ber of ships, 
tones) as to pre sent the Ro ma ni ans with solid ar gu ments. Though the fa mous trou-
ble shooter also re al ized that not the ships are at stake but Jews flee ing to safety3.
Ap par ently, Ger man ef forts were not in vain. With Feb ru ary, Ro ma nian au-
thori ties made firm prom ises to put an end to emi gra tion, as they re al ized that 
ships leav ing Ro ma nian har bors do not re turn, be ing con fis cated by the en emy – 
Radu Lecca in formed Gus tav Rich ter, who on his turn in formed Eichmann4. That 
was to en cour age with the spring of 1943 the SS, as well as the Ab wehr and the For-
eign Of fice to keep a close eye on emi gra tion, as to re al ize that de spite their com-
mon ef forts to pre vent it, hun dreds of Jews con tin ued to leave Ro ma nian har bors5. 
Fur ther more, they could not do much about it. They could not in sist, and were 
forced to keep a low pro file. Oth er wise, too many dis cus sions on this is sue would 
have re vealed the Ro ma ni ans that they are watched, turn ing them sus pi cious and 
of fended6. At best, what the Ger mans could ex pect from the Ro ma ni ans was to dis-
miss high rank of fi cers work ing with pri vate agen cies deal ing with Jew ish emi gra-
tion and turn ing it into good busi ness. Oth er wise, it re mained un clear to them 
who got the money, if the Ro ma ni ans really are against emi gra tion or they are sim-
ply de ceiv ing them while de pos ing those sus pected of cor rup tion7. They con tin-
ued to is sue pro tests, based on the same set of ar gu ments, and with the same goal: 
not to let Jews es cape. They also con tin ued to col lect in for ma tion on who is in-
volved in the op era tions, thus prov ing en mity to wards the Reich. They also moved 
to a higher level, reach ing Mi hai An tonescu, not know ing that on his turn, the Ro-
ma nian Prime Min is ter was mis in form ing his gov ern ment, while no ti fy ing them 
that Kill in ger is co op era tive, back ing Ro ma nia on emi gra tion pol icy, as he un der-
stands the rea sons be hind it8.
As a re sult, prepa ra tions for the emi gra tion of Jew ish chil dren from Ro ma nia 
to Pal es tine con tin ued, this time by land, cross ing Bul garia to reach Tur key9, with 
Ber lin con tinu ing to ask their dip lo mats to pro test, threat, in ter vene, as to halt it. 
One of the main con cerns was that the emi grants are car ry ing with them in for ma-
tion on the Fi nal So lu tion – con fis ca tion of docu ments re gard ing the Holo caust, 
not to reach Ge neva, be came a top pri or ity, as the en emy might have used them to 
1 Ibidem, doc. 123, pp. 579-584.
2 Ibidem, doc. 126, p. 588.
3 Ibidem, doc. 127, p. 590.
4 Ibidem, doc. 130, p. 597.
5 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Bilanţul tragediei – renaşterea speranţei, cit., doc. 326, 327, pp. 365-366.
6 Ottmar TRAŞCĂ, Dennis DELETANT (eds.), Al III-lea Reich…cit., doc. 133, p. 604.
7 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Bilanţul tragediei – renaşterea speranţei, cit., doc. 329, p. 367.
8 Ibidem, doc. 328, p. 366.
9 Ottmar TRAŞCĂ, Dennis DELETANT (eds.), Al III-lea Reich…cit., doc. 136, p. 610.
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fos ter anti-Ger man propa ganda1. Sec ond, emi gra tion was dan ger ous as it could 
help the al lies re al ize the con flict ing vi sions and poli cies be tween Ger many and its 
col labo ra tors2. Fur ther more, what the long serie of in ter ven tions and re ports in di-
cates is that, with the SS not be ing the de ter min ing agency in the case of al lied 
coun tries, ex perts on Jew ish mat ters, such as Franz Rade macher, work ing for the 
For eign Min is try, were as radi cal, de ter mined and pushy in their work ”to ward 
the Führer”. No Jew, not even chil dren (as most re ports re fer to them, and the ef-
forts to smug gle them from Hun gary, Ro ma nia, and Bul garia to Pal es tine, by hun-
dreds at best) were to es cape3.
The task for Ger man Dip lo mats in Bu cha rest was not easy as one hand they 
were pres sured from Ber lin, with the For eign Of fice adopt ing a rigid stance on emi-
gra tion, and on the other hand were in tro duced by the Ro ma ni ans with plans to 
con tinue it, in sur ing them that the Führer agreed on An tonescu’s new pol icy, there-
fore pro test ing against Ger man ac tions to stop the op era tions4. Hands tight, they 
could op er ate at the lower level, reach ing Lecca, Mi hai An tonescu at best, yet, 
never, Ion An tonescu. Not in a po si tion to give or ders, they used the best pre-
roga tive at hand: to post pone, never give a clear an swer, state re peat edly that Ger-
many was not in fa vor of emi gra tion, which was also not in the in ter est of Ro ma nia, 
with the mat ter to be re-dis cussed and re ex am ined5. An other strat egy was to ac-
cept the pro pos als but in clude con di tions that would ren der them im pos si ble – 
Eichmann ac cepted the emi gra tion of 5000 Jews in ex change for 20 000 Ger man 
males un der 40, to emi grate from Al lied con trolled ter ri to ries to the Reich6. The ini-
tia tive for fur ther dis cus sions with the al lies was left to the Ro ma ni ans, who did 
noth ing. With emi gra tion il le gal, from Ro ma nia, and to Pal es tine, Ro ma nian au-
thori ties opted for an other strat egy. Tak ing no di rect im pli ca tion, they al lowed 
Jew ish or gani za tions, the Red Cross, and travel agen cies to deal with vi sas, pass-
ports, funds to re im burse the costs for ship ment, and so on7.
With the pres sured by the USA Brit ish au thori ties turn ing more opened8, emi-
gra tion from Ro ma nia con tin ued, with the Ro ma nian au thori ties ne go ti at ing 
through Swiss dip lo mats. The plans soon ex panded as to in clude thou sands of 
chil dren from Ro ma nia, Po land, Lithua nia, Lat via, Hol land, and Den mark. More-
over, as Ger man re ports in di cate, Ro ma ni ans also ne go ti ated with the In ter na-
tional Red Cross, with the two An tonescu’s in fa vor of emi gra tion of Jews from 
over crowded Trans nis tria, as to get rid of them, with the only de bat able is sue be-
ing whether Ro ma nian or Red Cross ships to be used in the op era tion9. Ex as per-
ated Ger mans were to make one last at tempted to per suade the Ro ma ni ans to 
1 Ibidem, doc. 139, pp. 616-617.
2 Ibidem, doc. 137, pp. 612-613.
3 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Bilanţul tragediei – renaşterea speranţei, cit., doc. 330, pp. 367-368.
4 Ottmar TRAŞCĂ, Dennis DELETANT (eds.), Al III-lea Reich…cit., doc. 147, pp. 649-650.
5 Andreas HILLGRUBER, Hitler, Regele Carol…cit., pp. 283-284. In April 1943, in Klessheim, 
Ion Antonescu requested a clear answer, and approval, from Ribbentrop with regard the plan to 
ship 7000 children to Palestine, mostly orphans. Only in February 1944 Ribbentrop made his 
position clear to Ion Antonescu. 
6 Ottmar TRAŞCĂ, Dennis DELETANT (eds.), Al III-lea Reich…cit., doc. 152, 153, 154, pp. 665, 
666, 669-672.
7 Ibidem, doc. 148, pp. 651-656. 
8 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Bilanţul tragediei – renaşterea speranţei, cit., doc. 340, pp. 377-378.
9 Ottmar TRAŞCĂ, Dennis DELETANT (eds.), Al III-lea Reich…cit., doc. 155, p. 674.
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hand out the Jews for de por ta tion to the East (Po land) in stead of al low ing them to 
emi grate1. Also, this time with out in form ing the Ro ma ni ans, they were do ing 
their best to cap ture and/or sunk the ships, giv ing ex plicit or ders to the Ger man 
Navy how to pro ceed as to put an end to emi gra tion2. Though, they were soon to 
re al ize that mov ing from di plo macy to mili tary ac tion is risky, to of fend the Ro ma-
ni ans, and, as some mili tary re ports in di cate, rather un work able3.
By spring 1944, it was still un clear to the Ger mans what the Ro ma nian of fi-
cial po si tion was. Emi gra tion was il le gal, not a state co or di nated and spon sored 
pol icy, and yet, with the Ro ma ni ans ask ing them to fa cili tate the de par ture of 
ships to Is tan bul. Ion An tonescu de layed his an swer for months, the same way the 
Ger mans did it be fore4. A re port by Kill in ger, dated July 17, 1944 shows that by 
early June Mi hai An tonescu was ”in charge” with or ga niz ing emi gra tion, yet no 
con se quences fol lowed5. Mean while, ships con tin ued to live har bors to Pal es tine, 
with no pos si bil ity for the Ger man navy to block them6. Even Hun gar ian Jews 
were in cluded in trans ports, with now the Hun gar ian gov ern ment to com plain to 
the Ger mans, as the Ro ma ni ans did be fore, that the Jew ish Ques tion is ap proached 
dif fer ently by the Ro ma ni ans7.
In July 1944, not long be fore be ing ar rested, Mi hai An tonescu pre sented his 
cabi net with the re sults of emi gra tion, tak ing cred its for en dors ing the pol icy. 
Writ ing for the fu ture, less about the past, he pre sented his ef forts, his open ness to-
ward the al lies, de flect ing all fail ure to Ger man op po si tion, of ten of fend ing him 
and the Ro ma nian gov ern ment8. How ever, through out the war, Ro ma nian au-
thori ties were not do ing much to sup port emi gra tion in real terms. Tak ing as few 
risks as pos si ble, be ing eva sive and afraid not to trig ger Ger man re ac tions, they 
were theo reti cally ad vo cat ing in fa vor of emi gra tion as an ”In ter na tional So lu tion 
to the Jew ish Ques tion”, only to re mind oth ers, Ger mans in cluded, of Ro ma nia’s 
in de pend ence. En dors ing emi gra tion, the Ro ma ni ans also sig naled with March 
1943 that they are no longer in fa vor of a radi cal so lu tion. Oth er wise, the Ro ma-
nian gov ern ment could not find the way out from the laby rinth gen er ated by the 
logic and con text of war. No real pro gress was achieved, and no firm pol icy came 
out of the many pro jects to turn emi gra tion more vig or ous and ar ticu lated9. Fol-
low ing the logic of clean sing, not sav ing or pro tect ing, with Jews to leave as never 
to re turn10, no less anti-Se mitic and sus pi cious to ward the en emy popu la tion11, the 
Ro ma nian gov ern ment was mainly con cerned with tak ing ad van tage out of the 
fact that in midst of a con ti nent wide geno cide many came to ac cept and ad vo cate 
1 Ibidem, doc. 158, p. 681.
2 Ibidem, doc. 156, pp. 676-677.
3 Ibidem, doc. 173, p. 720.
4 Andreas HILLGRUBER, Hitler, Regele Carol…cit., p. 284.
5 Ibidem, p. 285. 
6 See Martin GILBERT, Auschwitz and the Allies, cit., pp. 186, 189, 201, 294, 295, 332. 3000 
children left Romania in 1944 with Bulgarian and Turkish ships: Maritza 244, Milca 250, Bella Cita 
150, Morina 308, Bülbül 390, Mefkure 320, Kazbek 752, Toros 980 (from April to December 1944). 
7 Andreas HILLGRUBER, Hitler, Regele Carol…cit., p. 286. 
8 Raul HILBERG, The Destruction of the European Jews, cit., pp. 701-702. Also Lya BENJAMIN 
(ed.), Bilanţul tragediei – renaşterea speranţei, cit., doc. 342, 346, 347, pp. 379, 382-385.
9 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Bilanţul tragediei – renaşterea speranţei, cit., doc. 339, 341, pp. 376-378.
10 Ibidem, doc. 344, p. 381.
11 Ottmar TRAŞCĂ, Dennis DELETANT (eds.), Al III-lea Reich…cit., doc. 176, pp. 726-727.
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emi gra tion as a prac tice1. Mov ing back and forth, at a time when Ro ma nia be came 
a bat tle field for pro and con in ter ven tions, halt ing as to re or gan ize, post pon ing emi-
gra tion for the af ter math of the war, as some were to ”take ad van tage of the suf fer-
ing of the Jews, with Ro ma nia to pay the bill”2, the gov ern ment de cided only with 
June-July, un der mas sive pres sure from the al lies3, to be part of the proc ess and 
turn emi gra tion into a state su per vised prac tice. An Of fice for Jew ish emi gra tion 
was cre ated to or gan ize trans ports, is sue lists with emi grants, and es tab lish pri ori-
ties (or phans from Trans nis tria, Hun gar ian refu gees, other Jews), pro cure vi sas 
and dis trib ute funds, as to turn emi gra tion ef fi cient and elimi nate cor rup tion4. 
More cau tious and wiser in the new con text, de part ing the Ger mans as to ap-
proach the al lies, the Ro ma ni ans de cided too late to move from emi gra tion to or-
gan ized emi gra tion. Or, bet ter say, from the per spec tive of vic tims, and when 
con sid er ing the co er cion ex er cised by po groms, de por ta tions, and the pres ence of 
Ger mans, forced emi gra tion, which is but part of the end less serie of poli cies that 
al to gether make the Holo caust.
With situ ational pres sure turn ing co er cive, Ro ma ni ans moved back to emi gra-
tion, a dif fer ent mean to cleanse, not save5. The dis po si tion to kill di min ished; the 
hos tile imagi na tion rested the same. The ex pla na tion for the dy namic of the Ro ma-
nian pol icy stays with the ca pac ity of a non-fas cist, au thori tar ian re gime to com-
pro mise, with con ven tional mo ral ity and prag ma tism count ing more than the 
his tori cal need to cleanse ”by all means and at all costs”6.
1 Lya BENJAMIN (ed.), Bilanţul tragediei – renaşterea speranţei, cit., doc. 343, p. 380.
2 Ibidem, doc. 353, 358, pp. 390-391, 396-397.
3 Ibidem, doc. 357, pp. 395-396.
4 Ibidem, doc. 366, p. 403.
5 Ottmar TRAŞCĂ, Dennis DELETANT (eds.), Al III-lea Reich…cit., p. 43. No document ex-
pli citly indicates, by any mean, the intention of the Romanian government to save Jews. 
6 Michael MANN, The Dark Side of Democracy…cit., pp. 193-195.
